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NOTE
LENDER-VENDOR'S LIABILITY FOR STRUCTURAL
DEFECTS IN NEW HOUSING
INTRODUCTION
The current economic tensions in today's financial com-
munity have affected the construction lending industry, particu-
larly in the area of housing. Construction lenders are frequently
forced to bring foreclosure actions against builders and devel-
opers, or to take deeds in lieu of foreclosure. After title has been
transferred, the lender proceeds with reselling, or completing and
then reselling, the housing projects. The lender's concern is the
preservation of his investment, but in recouping his investment
a lender may place himself in a position of liability for structural
defects. No court has yet ruled on the lender's liability when the
lender has actively participated in reselling, but, with the numer-
ous foreclosures being brought, the issue is sure to arise when a
purchaser of a defective dwelling seeks redress and must look to
someone other than the insolvent builder.
This note addresses the problem of potential liability to sub-
sequent purchasers which a construction lender may incur by
foreclosing on a housing development or condominium project. In
ruling on this issue a court must analogize to the law applicable
to the following three roles a lender assumes. First, by providing
the funds for the project which are disbursed after inspections of
the construction site at various stages of completion, the lender
performs the role of a typical construction lender. Second, by
accepting ownership of the development and then selling the
units to the public, the lender acts as a vendor of real property.
Third, if title to the project passes to the lender prior to comple-
tion and the lender is forced to finish and then sell the develop-
ment, the lender assumes the role of a builder-vendor. By acting
in these three capacities, the construction lender is in effect a
"lender-vendor."
This note begins with a review of the present law of liability
of a lender, vendor, and builder-vendor for structural defects in
housing, to provide the basis for an analysis of the as yet undeter-
mined liability of a person who occupies the unique status of
lender-vendor. Then it examines the factors which a court might
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consider in deciding whether or not a lender-vendor should be
liable for defective construction. Finally, it discusses the ways a
lender-vendor may avoid liability.
I. LIABILITY OF THE CONSTRUCTION LENDER
In the past the construction lender was liable to a home
purchaser only if it could be established that the lender was en-
gaged in a joint venture' with the builder-developer. Under the
law of joint venture the mortgagee is jointly and severally liable
as if a formal partnership existed with the builder.'
The definition of joint venture has not been explicitly set
forth by the courts because a joint venture does not arise by mere
operation of law. Instead, a joint venture's legal force is derived
from the voluntary agreement, either express or implied, of the
parties.3 However, one test to determine the existence of a joint
venture arose out of an Oklahoma case4 in which the court set
forth the following three requirements necessary to establish a
joint venture:
(1) There must be joint interest in the property by the parties
sought to be held as partners;
(2) there must be agreements, express or implied, to share in the
profits and losses of the venture; and
(3) there must be actions and conduct showing co-operation in the
project. None of these elements alone is sufficient.'
Under Colorado law "[t]he chief characteristic of a 'joint
adventure' is a 'joint and not a several profit.'"' This requirement
of joint profit has been strictly interpreted, as evidenced by one
case in which the Colorado Supreme Court found that no joint
venture between a construction lender and a homebuilder was
present where the lender's profits were set at $500 per house,
because the $500 had no correlation to the builder's profit.7
For a discussion of joint ventures, see Note, Joint Ventures, 36 VA. L. REv. 425
(1950).
2 Rowe v. Brooks, 329 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1964).
Connor v. Great W. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr.
369 (1968); Realty Dev. Co. v. Feit, 154 Colo. 44, 387 P.2d 898 (1963); Vern Shutte & Sons
v. Broadbent, 24 Utah 2d 415, 473 P.2d 885 (1970).
White v. A.C. Houston Lumber Co., 179 Okla. 89, 64 P.2d 908 (1937).
Id. at 91, 64 P.2d at 910. This test has been adopted in Colorado. See Realty Dev.
Co. v. Feit, 154 Colo. 44, 387 P.2d 898 (1963), citing Commercial Lumber Co. v. Nelson,
181 Okla. 122, 72 P.2d 829 (1937).
Fedderson v. Goode, 112 Colo. 38, 145 P.2d 981 (1944).
Realty Dev. Co. v. Feit, 154 Colo. 44, 387 P.2d 898 (1963).
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Therefore, in Colorado it is fairly simple to prevent a lender's
liability under a theory of joint venture by severing the return to
the lender from the builder's potential profits.
Actions by purchasers against construction lenders in other
jurisdictions have also been unsuccessful where the suits were
based on a theory of joint venture. For example, in one case, even
though the lender and the builder combined their property, skill,
and knowledge, shared control of the development, and each
expected profits to result, the court held it was not a joint venture
as "neither was to share in the profits or losses that the other
might realize or suffer."' Because of the reluctance of courts to
find a joint venture between a lender and a builder, home buyers
have sought recovery from lenders under different theories.
The theory of construction lender liability based on negli-
gence was introduced in Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan
Association.' There the California Supreme Court dismissed an
action against a lender based on joint venture, relying on negli-
gence in its effort to establish liability of the lender. The immedi-
ate barrier to recovery under negligence was privity. The con-
struction lender's duty to the shareholders of the lending institu-
tion had been established; however, no duty had been established
between a lender and a home buyer who was not the mortgagor
of the lender.'0 In Connor the court ruled that the construction
lender owed a duty to "buyers of the homes to exercise reasonable
care to protect them from damages caused by major structural
defects."" The facts of Connor became important when the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals, in Bradler v. Craig,'2 limited Connor to
Connor v, Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 863, 447 P.2d 609, 615, 73
Cal. Rptr. 369, 375 (1968).
Id.
Id. at 865-66, 447 P.2d at 617, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377. The duty test used by the court
consisted of the six-point test established in Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d
16 (1958). The six-point test included:
[11 [Tihe extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plain-
tiff, [2] the foreseeability of harm to him, [31 the degree of certainty that
the plaintiff suffered injury, [41 the closeness of the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, [5] the moral blame attached
to the defendant's conduct and [6] the policy of preventing future harm.
Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
69 Cal. 2d at 866, 447 P.2d at 617, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
, 274 Cal. App. 2d 446, 79 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969).
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its facts. In Connor the court had characterized the defendant
lender as being
much more than a lender content to lend money at interest on the
security of real property. It became an active participant in a home
construction enterprise. It had the right to exercise extensive control
of the enterprise. Its financing, which made the enterprise possible,
took on ramifications beyond the domain of the usual money lender.
It received not only interest on its construction loans, but also sub-
stantial fees for making them, a 20 percent capital gain for "ware-
housing" the land, and protection from loss of profits in the event
individual home buyers sought permanent financing elsewhere.,3
A year later, the Bradler court limited the holding in Connor to
a situation where a construction lender acted beyond his normal
capacity and the borrower was undercapitalized.' 4 Moreover, the
California legislature displayed its concern over Connor and its
possible adverse effect upon the state's housing industry by
adopting a statute limiting the possible application of the case's
doctrine. '5
Since the decision in Connor, neither California nor any
other jurisdiction has found a construction lender liable to a sub-
sequent purchaser in a negligence action based on structural de-
fects. The courts have refused to find the necessary extra involve-
ment of the construction lender,'" and, given the lack of the case's
69 Cal. 2d at 864, 447 P.2d at 616, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
274 Cal. App. 2d 446, 79 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969).
CAL.. CIv. ConE § 3434 (West 1970). The statute provides:
A lender who makes a loan of money, the proceeds of which are used or
may be used by the borrower to finance the design, manufacture, construc-
tion, repair, modification or improvement of real or personal property for sale
or lease to others, shall not be held liable to third persons for any loss or
damage occasioned by any defect in the real or personal property so de-
signed, manufactured, constructed, repaired, modified or improved or for
any loss or damage resulting from the failure of the borrower to use due care
in the design, manufacture, construction, repair, modification or improve-
ment of such real or personal property, unless such loss or damage is a result
of an act of the lender outside the scope of the activities of a lender of money
or unless the lender has been a party to misrepresentations with respect to
such real or personal property.
Id.
" See, e.g., Callaizakis v. Astro Dev. Co., 4 Il1. App. 3d 163, 280 N.E.2d 512 (1972);
Schenectady Sav. Bank v. Bartosik, 77 Misc. 2d 391, 353 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1974);
Christiansen v. Philcent Corp., 221 Pa. Super. 157, 313 A.2d 249 (1973).
VOL. 53
LENDER-VENDOR'S LIABILITY
development, the legal community's initial concern over Connor
seems to have been unwarranted. 7
II. LIABILITY OF THE VENDOR
When the lender forecloses, or takes a deed in lieu of foreclo-
sure, on a completed housing or condominium project and then
resells the completed units, he may be acting as a vendor for the
purpose of determining liability for construction defects. Gener-
ally, the vendor of real estate is not liable for a vendee's or third
party's personal injuries which were proximately caused by a
defective condition of the property." In some cases this is true
even if the vendor had personal knowledge of the defect which
caused the injury." Clearly, the vendor is not liable if the harm
arises from a condition which came into existence after the sale
of the property."0
The lender needs to be aware of recently developed excep-
tions to the general rule of the vendor's nonliability. Vendors have
been held liable for injuries resulting from defects which created
an unreasonable danger to those using the premises, if the vendor
knew of the defects and could reasonably have anticipated that
the vendee would not discover them.' If the vendor actively con-
17 Comment, Construction Financer Held to Have Duty to Protect Purchasers of
Defective Homes Against Loss, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 639 (1969); Comment, Liability of the
Institutional Lender for Structural Defects in New Housing, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 739 (1968);
Comment, New Liability in Construction Lending: Implications of Connor v. Great West-
ern Savings & Loan, 42 So. CAL. L. REV. 353 (1969).
" Copfer v. Golden, 135 Cal. App. 2d 623, 288 P.2d 90 (1955); Combow v. Kansas City
Ground Inv. Co., 358 Mo. 934, 218 S.W.2d 539 (1949); Hut v. Antonio, 95 N.J. Super. 62,
229 A.2d 823 (1967). The Restatement of Torts provides:
Except as stated in § 353, a vendor of land is not subject to liability for
physical harm caused to his vendee or others while upon the land after the
vendee has taken possession by any dangerous condition, whether natural or
artificial, which existed at the time that the vendee took possession.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 352 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
" Smith v. Tucker, 151 Tenn. 347, 270 S.W. 16 (1925).
2) RESTATEMENT § 351.
' Herzog v. Capital Co., 27 Cal. 2d 349, 164 P.2d 8 (1945); Southern v. Floyd, 89 Ga.
App. 602, 80 S.E.2d 450 (1954). According to the Restatement:
(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any
condition, whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to
persons on the land, is subject to liability to the vendee and others upon the
land with the consent of the vendee or his subvendee for physical harm
caused by the condition after the vendee has taken possession, if
(a) the vendee does not know or have reason to know of the condition or the
risk involved, and
(b) the vendor knows or has reason to know of the condition, and realizes or
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cealed the defect, potential liability exists until the vendee dis-
covers the defect or has a reasonable opportunity to do so. Other-
wise, the vendor is liable until the vendee has had a reasonable
time to discover the defective condition and take the necessary
precautions." Despite a trend toward expansion of liability in this
area, there are still many recent decisions in which courts have
not accepted this exception to vendor nonliability.23
Another exception to the general rule of vendor nonliability
is recognized where a public or private nuisance exists. If, for
example, the condition of the subject property is such that an
unreasonable risk of harm is created to those outside the prop-
erty, the vendor remains liable for a reasonable time after the
transfer of possession for injuries proximately caused by the con-
dition of the premises.
24
III. LIABILITY OF THE BUILDER-VENDOR
A construction lender taking title to a partially-completed
condominium or housing development by foreclosure or a deed in
lieu of foreclosure might be held liable as a builder-vendor25 for
defective construction. The courts have distinguished the
builder-vendor from an ordinary vendor, who is commonly an
inexperienced consumer not involved in the building process. A
should realize the risk involved, and has reason to believe that the vendee
will not discover the condition or realize the risk.
RFSTATFMENT § 353.
22 E.g., Cavanaugh v. Pappas, 91 N.J. Super. 597, 222 A.2d 34 (Union County Ct.
1966); Pavelchack v. Finn, 153 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup. Ct. 1956), afi'd, 6 App. Div. 2d 841,
176 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1958); Rufo v. South Brooklyn Say. Bank, 268 App. Div. 1057, 52
N.Y.S.2d 469 (1945), appeal dismissed, 295 N.Y. 981, 68 N.E.2d 60 (Ct. App. 1946). See
also RESTATEMENT § 353(2).
21 Swinton v. Whitinsville Say. Bank, 311 Mass. 677, 42 N.E.2d 808 (1942); Day v.
Frederickson, 153 Minn. 380, 190 N.W. 788 (1922); Riley v. White, 231 S.W.2d 291 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1950).
21 Derby v. Public Serv. Co., 100 N.H. 53, 119 A.2d 335 (1955); Wilks v. New York
Tel. Co., 243 N.Y. 351, 153 N.E. 444 (1926); RESTATEMENT § 374. See also W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 64, at 413 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
22 The definition of builder as used in this article is:
One whose occupation is the building or erection of structures, the control-
ling and directing of construction, or the planning, constructing, remodeling
and adopting to particular uses buildings and other structures.
Bi.ACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 243-44 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). See also Howard v. State, 85 Cal. App.
2d 361, 193 P.2d 11 (1948). The term "builder," as used in this discussion of implied
warranty and strict liability, refers to a "mass builder," or one who builds on a scale
similar to that of a manufacturer of chattels.
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builder-vendor, on the other hand, has expertise in the construc-
tion business and expects profits from his building activity. Be-
cause of this distinction, courts have imposed liability for struc-
tural defects by analogizing the builder-vendor to the manufac-
turer of chattels in product liability cases. Suits against the
builder-vendor can, therefore, be based upon fraud,"5 breach of
contract,2" breach of express" or implied warranty," negligence, 3
and strict liability."' In considering the liability of the lender as
a builder-vendor, this note will limit its scope to developments in
the areas of implied warranty, negligence, and strict liability.
A. Implied Warranty
A brief discussion of express warranty provides an introduc-
tion to an examination of implied warranty. In the builder-vendor
classification, even statements of a general nature made concern-
ing the quality of the construction may be interpreted by courts
as an express warranty.2 The plaintiff bringing an action under
express warranty faces many obstacles to recovery, such as the
parol evidence rule,3 3 the merger doctrine,34 and a classification
of the statement as mere "puffing.
' '35
Implied warranty, first applied to the sale of realty in 1957, 3
is now generally accepted as a cause of action in lawsuits involv-
ing real estate sales. 31 Courts have variously stated the content of
25 E.g., Borriss v. Edwards, 262 Ala. 172, 77 So. 2d 909 (1955).
" E.g., Caparrelli v. Rolling Greens, Inc., 39 N.J. 585, 190 A.2d 369 (1963).
25 E.g., Jackson v. Buesgens, 290 Minn. 78, 186 N.W.2d 184 (1971).
E.g., Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963).
E.g., Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1178 (1972).
E.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
32 See, e.g., Jackson v. Buesgens, 290 Minn. 78, 186 N.W. 2d 184 (1971); Caparelli v.
Rolling Greens, Inc., 39 N.J. 585, 190 A.2d 369 (1963); LaBar v. Lindstrom, 158 Minn.
396, 197 N.W. 756 (1924).
See, e.g., Shapiro v. Kornicks, 103 Ohio App. 49, 124 N.E.2d 175 (1955); Moore v.
Werner, 418 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
See text accompanying notes 47-54 infra.
"' See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313(2), for a definition of "puffing" as it
applies to the sale of goods.
:5 Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957).
7 Cases applying the doctrine of implied warranty are: Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala.
439, 252 So. 2d 313 (1971); Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970);
Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969); Glisan v.
Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963); Vernali v. Centrella, 28 Conn. Sup. 476,
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a builder-vendor's implied warranty as a warranty of fitness,"'
or merchantability,"0 or as a warranty that construction has been
completed in a workmanlike manner.4 Although some jurisdic-
tions have eliminated implied warranty through statute,4' and
some courts have refused to adopt it,4" the modern court attitude
is reflected in Gable v. Silver.43 There the court stated that appli-
cation of the doctrine of implied warranty to sales of realty is
"based upon present day trends, logic, and practical justice in
realty dealings.""
The original rule was that an implied warranty arose only
from the sale of unfinished dwellings. Colorado has taken the lead
in extending the rule to homes purchased after completion of
construction,' and, although the Colorado extension has been
266 A.2d 200 (Super. Ct. 1970); Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972);
Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Hanavan v. Dye, 4 Ill. App. 3d
576, 281 N.E.2d 398 (1972); Theis v. Heuer, 149 Ind. App. 52, 270 N.E.2d 764 (1971);
Weeks v. Slavick Builders, Inc., 24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503, aff'd, 384 Mich.
257, 181 N.W.2d 271 (1970); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972);
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Jones v. Gatewood,
381 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963); Yepsen v. Burgess, 525 P.2d 1019 (Ore. 1974); Padula v.
J.J. Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., 111 R.I. 29, 298 A.2d 529 (1973); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff,
254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 47,
154 N.W.2d 803 (1967); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968); Rothberg v.
Olenik, 128 Vt. 295, 262 A.2d 461 (1970); House v. Thornton, 457 P.2d 199 (Wash. 1969).
For general discussions of movement away from caveat emptor, see Bearman, Caveat
Emptor in Sales in Realty-Recent Assaults upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REv. 541 (1961);
Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 835 (1967).
' E.g., Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., [19311 2 K.B. 113.
' E.g., Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
E.g., Perry v. Sharon Dev. Co., 4 All E.R. 390 (1937).
" ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-435(A) (1974); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1113 (West 1954); MIcH.
STAT. ANN. § 26.524 (1970); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1297 (1962).
" E.g., Allen v. Wilkinson, 250 Md. 395, 243 A.2d 515 (1968).
258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
Id. at 18.
Carpenter v. Donohue, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964). The Colorado Supreme
Court stated:
That a different rule should apply to the purchaser of a house which is
near completion than would apply to one who purchases a new house seems
incongruous. To say that the former may rely on an implied warranty and
the latter cannot is recognizing a distinction without a reasonable basis for
it . . ..
We hold that the implied warranty doctrine is extended to include
agreements between builder-vendors and purchasers for the sale of newly
constructed buildings, completed at the time of contracting. There is an
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followed,4" it has yet to be accepted by a majority of the states.
The doctrine of merger affects the law of both implied and
express warranty. The majority of states have followed the rule
"that in a contract to convey real property the deed merges with
the contract and the only redress of a purchaser may be found in
the covenants in the deed or in an action to rescind based on fraud
or mistake.""7 To circumvent the problem in Colorado, the su-
preme court has held that warranties on a contract for construc-
tion and sale of a house do not merge with the deed, as delivery
of the deed is only part performance of such a contract." In other
jurisdictions, courts have not allowed the doctrine of merger to
limit the scope of implied warranty in this area.4" For support,
they cite reasons of public policy, ' characterize the nature of the
defect as latent rather than patent,5' look to the intent of the
parties," and refer to state statutes. 3
The standards of conformity required by implied warranties
are as diverse as the rationales for adopting the doctrine of im-
plied warranty.54 In Colorado the standard of reasonable conform-
ity with respect to the implied warranty in new housing has been
expressed as "what the workman of average skill and intelligence
(the conscientious worker) would ordinarily do."5 A much quoted
standard of conformity is contained in Hubler v. Bachman:5"
implied warranty that builder-vendors have complied with the building code
of the area in which the structure is located.
Id. at 83, 388 P.2d at 402.
,' Weeks v. Slavick Builders, Inc., 24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503, aff'd 384
Mich. 257, 181 N.W.2d 271 (1970).
11 Note, Builder Vendor Liability for Construction Defects in Homes, 55 MARQ. L.
REV. 369, 372 (1972).
19 Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 280, 387 P.2d 260, 263 (1963). In Georgia, the
doctrine of caveat emptor is more or less preserved by the merger doctrine. Amos v.
McDonald, 123 Ga. App. 509, 181 S.E.2d 515 (1971).
" See generally Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Mer-
chant Did It, 52 CORNElL L.Q. 835 (1967). See also 3 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 723, at
2058 (rev. ed. 1936).
5o E.g., Staff v. Lido Dunes, Inc., 47 Misc. 2d 322, 262 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1965).
Id.
' E.g., Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
3 See Note, supra note 47.
See, e.g., cases cited note 37 supra.
Shiffers v. Cunningham Shepherd Builders Co., 28 Colo. App. 29, 41, 470 P.2d 593,
598 (1970).
11 12 Ohio Misc. 22, 230 N.E.2d 461 (C.P. Ashland County 1967).
1976
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It is the duty of a builder of a structure to perform his work in
a workmanlike manner, that is, the work should be done as a skilled
workman should do it and the law exacts from a builder, ordinary
care and skill only."
Therefore, the standard of conformity is flexible and subject to
local interpretation. The construction lender who becomes a
builder-vendor can only take notice of the inexact standards and
proceed with appropriate caution, knowing only that perfection
is not demanded.
The potential liability of the builder-vendor can be limited
in two ways: First, warranties can be held to apply only to the
first purchaser;"5 and, second, statutes can be used to limit the
time in which an action must be brought. 9
B. Negligence0
The introduction of negligence into the field of real estate
initially was blocked by the requirement of privity of contract.'
This doctrine held that a duty was owed only to a party in privity
of contract with the defendant; adherence to privity resulted in
liability of the builder-vendor only to the parties with whom he
had contracted.2 The doctrine was first eroded in cases involving
chattels. In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.6 3 the plaintiff was
allowed to bring suit against the manufacturer of the plaintiffs
automobile even though he had purchased from a retail dealer
and appeared to be without privity of contract. In circumventing
the privity requirement, Judge Cardozo stated:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place
life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of
Id. at 22, 230 N.E.2d at 463.
H.B. Bolas Enterprises, Inc. v. Zarlengo, 156 Colo. 530, 400 P.2d 447 (1965); Galle-
gos v. Graff, 32 Colo. App. 213, 508 P.2d 798 (1973); Barnes v. MacBrown & Co., 323
N.E.2d 671 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975). In one case, however, warranty was extended to the
homeowner, even though he was technically the second purchaser, because the first pur-
chaser was a realty company. Utz v. Moss, 31 Colo. App. 475, 503 P.2d 365 (1972).
5' See note 100 infra.
" For a general discussion of the historic development of the doctrine, see Bearman,
Caveat Emptor in Sale of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541
(1961); Note, Application of Strict Liability to the Production of Defective Realty, 13 Aiuz.
L. REv. 643 (1971).
61 Curtin v. Somerset, 140 Pa. 70, 21 A. 244 (1891); Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M.
& W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
2 Buttery Food, Inc. v. Deer Lodge County, 148 Mont. 350, 420 P.2d 845 (1966).
.3 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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danger. . . . If to the element of danger there is added knowledge
that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and
used without new tests, then, irrespective of contracts, the manufac-
turer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully. 4
At first the courts refused to extend the MacPherson ration-
ale to realty,6" but exceptions to the strict requirement of
contractual privity were gradually developed." The trend toward
the elimination of privity in construction liability was begun in
1932 in Wright v. Holland Furnace Co.67 The defendant in Wright
argued that the-only party to whom he was liable was Mrs.
Wright, because she was the only party with whom he had con-
tracted; the court, however, found privity on the part of her hus-
band and son. Later, in Hanna v. Fletcher,6" the common law rule
of privity was specifically rejected and the MacPherson doctrine
was adopted in its place.
Colorado has applied the MacPherson doctrine to real prop-
erty. The Colorado Supreme Court has held, in a negligence ac-
tion, that liability results because of a breach of duty owed to
others, and not because of a breach of a contractual relationship. 9
In 1972 the court of appeals stated:
By applying the MacPherson doctrine to the building of structures
on real property, we hold that where the completed work is reason-
ably certain to endanger third persons if negligently constructed, a
contractor or builder of real property is liable for injuries or death
of third persons occurring after the completion of the work and after
its acceptance by the owner."0
In other jurisdictions application of the MacPherson doctrine
to cases of builder-vendor liability has become almost the univer-
Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1926). The court stated that
the negligence of a contractor in constructing a building will not render him
liable to a third person, who is injured in consequence thereof after the work
has been completed and accepted by the owner of the building.
This case still provides the basis upon which modern courts have refused to extend to real
estate the MacPherson view of tort duty.
68 Prosser states that the historic exceptions to the privity rule developed in cases
involving fraud, inherently dangerous objects, and implied privity. PROSSER § 104, at 680-
81.
7 186 Minn. 265, 243 N.W. 387 (1932).
231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989 (1956).
Lembke Plumbing & Heating v; Hayutin, 148 Colo. 334, 366 P.2d 673 (1961).
70 Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 580, 498 P.2d 1179, 1181-82 (1972).
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sal rule.7 A builder is held liable to those who are foreseeably
expected to use the premises where injuries are caused by the
defective structure when dangerous conditions known to the
builder are not disclosed to the purchaser. 2 The rule has been
extended to work done negligently," to negligent design of a
building,74 and to repair as well as to original construction." This
last extension is very important to the construction lender who
forecloses on a completed project, for he may be considered a
builder-vendor for liability purposes if he undertakes any repair
work in order to sell the housing units. Recently, a builder-vendor
was held liable for an injury caused by a sliding glass door after
possession of the property had been surrendered by the builder-
vendor and the plaintiff had, in remodeling, moved the door that
caused the accident.
76
Liability for negligence can be based upon a builder's "rea-
son to know" of the defect, as well as upon actual knowledge.77
The rationale for not requiring actual knowledge is the pur-
chaser's lack of familiarity with the complexities of home con-
struction, and the feeling of courts that the purchaser should be
able to rely upon the builder's skill.78
7' PROSSER § 104, at 681.
72 Thompson v. Burke Eng'r Sales Co., 252 Iowa 146, 106 N.W.2d 351 (1960); Krisov-
ich v. John Booth, Inc., 181 Pa. Super. 5, 121 A.2d 890 (1956); Fisher v. Simon, 15 Wis.
2d 207, 112 N.W.2d 705 (1961).
71 Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d 908 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
334 U.S. 846 (1948).
Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179 (1972).
Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989 (1956). The
Restatement says of builder liability in negligence:
One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any
other condition thereon is subject to liability to others upon or outside of the
land for physical harm caused to them by the dangerous character of the
structure or condition after his work has been accepted by the possessor,
under the same rules as those determining the liability of one who as manu-
facturer or independent contractor makes a chattel for the use of others.
RESTATEMENT § 385.
7B Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179 (1972).
" Caporaletti v. A-F Corp., 137 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 240
F.2d 53 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
7 The question arises as to the standard of care a builder must use in his attempt to
discover construction defects. The homebuilder is in a strong position to argue that he
should not be held to the same duty as the manufacturer of chattels to which MacPherson
initially applied. Bearman, supra note 60, at 569. Such an argument would draw upon
the inherent differences between the more complex home and the ordinary chattel. To
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The difficulty in establishing all the elements composing
negligence79 renders this form of action unsatisfactory in meeting
the needs of the plaintiff. Purchasers, therefore, have relied upon
other theories of law, such as implied warranty or strict liability,
in actions against builders.
C. Strict Liability"0
In the past half century, the law of negligence has experi-
enced a whittling down of the idea that there is no liability with-
out fault, because policy considerations have demanded the re-
emergence of the even older rule of strict liability.8 ' Strict liabil-
ity is codified in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts" and, if extended to real estate cases, section 402A could
illustrate, it has been estimated the average home consists of 30,000 parts, six times as
many as an automobile. American Housing-Problems and Prospects, 20th Century
Fund, 1944, at 41. Also, a home is far more vulnerable to weather-created defects than
the ordinary chattel. For these reasons, the lender could argue that a homebuilder should
be held to a lower standard of care than a manufacturer of chattels. For a discussion of
why MacPherson should not be extended to real property, see Judge Prettyman's dissent-
ing opinion in Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989
(1956).
, The actor is liable for an invasion of an interest of another, if:
(a) the interest invaded is protected against unintentional invasion, and
(b) the conduct of the actor is negligent with respect to the other, or a class
of persons within which he is included, and
(c) the actor's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and
(d) the other has not so conducted himself as to disable himself from bringing
an action for such invasion.
RESTATEMENT § 281.
The action of negligence has assumed a much more favorable position with respect to the
plaintiffs through the emergence of res ipsa loquitur. Id. § 328D. When applicable to the
circumstances of a case, all of the elements of negligence are satisfied by res ipsa loquitur
with the exception of proximate cause. For a discussion of what constitutes proximate
cause, see Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469 (1876):
The true rule is that what is the proximate cause of an injury is ordinarily a
question for the jury. It is not a question of science or of legal knowledge. It
is to be determined as a fact, in view of the circumstances of fact attending
it.
Id. at 474.
" See Note, Application of Strict Liability to the Production of Defective Realty, 13
ARIZ. L. REv. 643 (1971).
" PROSSER § 75, at 494.
2 Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
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provide for the imposition of liability on a builder-vendor re-
gardless of the degree of care exercised in the construction pro-
cess. This extension of section 402A seems reasonable, in light
of a recent amendment to the section to allow recovery for "any
product," including, arguably, realty. Although the concept of
strict liability for products has been accepted by a majority of
the states,"3 the application of strict liability to the field of real
estate first occurred in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc. 4
In Schipper plaintiffs' infant child was scalded by water dis-
charged from a bathroom faucet. The defendant, a mass builder
of homes, had deliberately failed to follow a manufacturer's rec-
ommendation that a mixing valve be used to prevent the dis-
charge of excessively hot water. In imposing strict liability on the
homebuilder, the court said:"
The law should be based on current concepts of what is right
and just and the judiciary should be alert to the never-ending need
for keeping its common law principles abreast of the times. Ancient
distinctions which make no sense in today's society and tend to
discredit the law should be rejected . . . . We consider that there
are no meaningful distinctions between Levitt's mass production
and sale of homes and the mass production and sale of automobiles
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT § 402A.
Professor Prosser has said in reference to section 402A that:
This was accompanied by a comment saying that if anyone wished to
treat this as a "warranty," there was nothing to prevent it; but if so, it should
be recognized, that the "warranty" was a very different kind of warranty
from those usually found in the sale of goods, and that it is not subject to
the various contract rules which have grown up to surround such sales.
PROSSER § 98, at 657.
" PROSSER § 98, at 658.
" 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
" The court relied on Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960), and Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
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and that the pertinent overriding policy considerations are the same.
That being so, the warranty or strict liability principles of Henning-
sen and Santor should be carried over into the realty field, at least
in the aspect dealt with here. 6
Schipper presented the perfect factual situation for imposing lia-
bility because Levitt & Sons, as a mass producer of homes, was
analogous to the manufacturer of chattels.
California has further extended this imposition of strict lia-
bility in realty to cover economic loss87 and loss attributable to
defective building sites sold by a developer, in addition to allow-
ing recovery for personal injuries.8 These decisions demonstrate
the far-reaching effects of adoption of the principle of strict liabil-
ity.
Although it had been predicted that strict liability would
rapidly become the rule in the housing construction industry,89
opposition to such an extension of the doctrine into realty has
been expressed. Schipper, therefore, has gained only limited ac-
ceptance in the real estate field. 0 The Colorado Court of Appeals
enunciated such opposition in Wright v. Creative Corp."' where
the plaintiffs relied on Schipper to establish strict liability for
injuries sustained by their 5-year old child who walked through a
sliding-glass door. The court stated:
Even if we assume that Creative was a mass producer of homes, this
court would be remiss in its responsibilities if it did not closely
consider the need for awarding damages without requiring a specific
showing of negligence on the part of the mass producer.2
The court concluded that the purposes served by the doctrine of
strict liability would not be achieved by its application to the
44 N.J. at 90, 207 A.2d at 325.
Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
The court found the builder liable for the $5,073.18 diminution in the value of the home
due to the corroding of a radiant heating system rendering it nonfunctional.
" Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969). The
developer was liable for a defective building site where the rear portion of the site, which
had been improved with a residential structure, had failed due to poor drainage and
inadequate soil compaction. Another example of California's extension of the law is pro-
vided in Stuart v. Crestview Mutual Water Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 802, 110 Cal. Rptr. 543
(1973), where a developer was held liable for fire damages caused in part by a failure to
supply an adequate water distribution system.
' PROSSFRa § 104, at 682.
*o E.g., State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966); Worrell v.
Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971).
30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179 (1972).
g7 Id. at 581, 498 P.2d at 1182.
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housing industry because of distinctions between real property
and chattels. Stating that the underlying reason for development
of the doctrine of strict liability was to assure that the cost of
injuries attributable to a defective product would be borne by the
manufacturers who put the product on the market, rather than
by the powerless purchaser who was the subject of the injury, the
court said: "[T]he predominant problem with effectuating re-
covery for injuries caused by a chattel is the difficulty of finding
the negligent party and effecting a recovery from that party."' 3
It pointed out that a builder cannot limit his liabilities by express
warranties and disclaimers as easily as a manufacturer can, and
it noted that a defect is more readily traced back to the builder
than to a manufacturer, since there are more opportunities to
inspect the real property while under construction than there are
to inspect the manufacturing of a chattel. 4
A plaintiff thus has three possible causes of action against a
builder-vendor: negligence, implied warranty, and strict liability.
Depending on the jurisdiction, a plaintiff may bring suit on all
three theories concurrently." ' Regardless of the theory behind an
action, the state statutes govern the time period in which the
action must be brought. In Colorado the plaintiff is allowed up
to 10 years to bring an action, and so a builder is open to potential
liability for a considerable length of time.96
Id. at 582, 498 P.2d at 1182.
I d. See also Macomber v. Cox, 249 Ore. 61, 435 P.2d 462 (1967). In this case Oregon
refused to extend strict liability into the area of real property.
See, e.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
6 The applicable statute provides:
(1) All actions against any architect, contractor, engineer or inspector
brought to recover damages for injury to person or property caused by the
design, planning, supervision, inspection, construction, or observation of
construction of any improvement to real property shall be brought within
two years after the claim for relief arises, and not thereafter, but in no case
shall such an action be brought more than ten years after the substantial
completion of the improvement to the real property, except as provided in
subsection (2) of this section.
(2) In case such injury to person or property occurs during the tenth year
after substantial completion of the improvement to real property, said action
shall be brought within one year after the dat6 upon which said injury oc-
curred.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as extending the period or
periods provided by the laws of Colorado or by agreement of the parties for
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IV. PROSPECTIVE LENDER-VENDOR LIABILITY FOR STRUCTURAL
DEFECTS
Having reviewed the law as it presently applies to the three
roles a construction lender may fill in a foreclosure situation, this
note turns now to an analysis of what potential liability a lender
may incur by foreclosing and to the protections available against
such liability.
Foreclosure may have special implications to the lender-
vendor's liability in his role as a lender. As noted in the discussion
of the construction lender's liability,97 the court's primary interest
has focused on the lender's acting beyond his capacity as an
ordinary mortgagee. The foreclosure and subsequent completion
and sale of the units may, in the eyes of the court, satisfy this
condition of acting beyond the ordinary lender's capacity. By
foreclosing before completion of the housing project, the construc-
tion lender functions beyond his normal operations in completing
and marketing the units. In addition to a change in the lender's
activities, the nature of the lender's economic return also
changes. After foreclosure, rather than realizing a set rate of in-
terest, any profits to be realized will be directly tied to the success
in marketing the housing units." Imposition of liability on the
lender, then, would be dependent upon his activities and on the
altered nature of his return due to the foreclosure.
On the other hand, there are strong arguments against impo-
sition of liability on the lender-vendor. While completion and
resale of a project are not common functions of the lending indus-
try, they become common functions when a borrowing developer
is in default. To rebut the argument that the lender-vendor's
financial interest is "beyond the ordinary," a distinction can be
drawn between the situation of the foreclosing mortgagee and
that of the defendant in Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan
Association.9 In Connor the nature of the lender's return was
bringing any action, nor shall this section be construed as creating any cause
of action not existing or recognized before June 1, 1969.
CoiLo. REXV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-127 (1973).
" See text accompanying notes 1-17 supra.
" It is assumed that, if the project is sold only for loss minimization, it would still
be viewed as a nontypical form of return to the lender by the court.
" 49 Cal. at 647, 320 P.2d at 16.
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determined prior to the closing of the loan, whereas in a foreclo-
sure proceeding the change in the lender's return does not occur
until well after the closing, and is not planned by the lender at
the time the loan is made.'""
The potential liability of the lender-vendor, where construc-
tion of the development is completed, arises because of the mort-
gagee's characterization as a vendor. Normally, a vendor's liabil-
ity has been limited to defects of which he had actual knowledge,
with exceptions to the general rule of nonliability in cases which
involve the existence of a public or private nuisance on the prop-
erty.'0 ' This rule is generally adequate to protect the lender-
vendor from liability. However, the factual situation considered
in this note differs from that of the normal real estate transaction,
which would be subject to the general rule of vendor's nonliabil-
ity.'12 Here, the units to be sold by the lender have never been
occupied by him; thus, the chance for his discovery of defects for
which he would be liable are minimal.'
0 3
As opposed to the normal lender-vendor, the construction
lender, although not technically involved in the construction of
the units, will normally conduct periodic inspections of the con-
struction and review the plans and specifications prior to the
committal of funds. This minimal involvement and expertise ex-
ceeds that of an ordinary vendor and may be another reason for
courts to deny the application of the general rule of vendor nonlia-
bility. The construction lender, moreover, maintains a profit mo-
tive dissimilar to that of an ordinary vendor. Based upon the
construction lender's involvement as an inspector and his profit
motive, courts should not treat this lender like a "mere vendor"
concerning potential liability for structural defects.
When a construction lender takes over an uncompleted pro-
"' This article assumes that the construction lender makes the loan without expecta-
tion of inevitable default and foreclosure. The problem that may be created when the
lender has knowledge that the borrower will inevitably default is not considered.
" See text accompanying note 24 supra.
'* Analogy may be made to Utz v. Moss, 31 Colo. App. 475, 503 P.2d 365 (1972), in
which the court held that a realty company should not be considered an ordinary home-
owner for purposes of establishing privity between the builder and the second purchaser
of the house.
"I In the normal vendor situation, the vendor has occupied the premises and has had
a reasonable opportunity to discover defects for which he may be held liable.
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ject, the greatest chance of liability arises. In such a case, courts
are likely to apply the law of builder-vendor, which is much more
strict than that imposed upon the lender or vendor, because a
builder-vendor faces actions arising out of implied warranty,04
negligence,'' and strict liability. 00 It is doubtful that the lender
will be able to argue that he is not actually a builder, since courts
have already extended liability beyond actual builders to devel-
opers.' "7 Therefore, it would be difficult for the lender to prove
that he did not at least become a developer in assuming the
responsibility for completing the units.
Under the theory of implied warranty, the construction
lender might avoid liability if he sold the units after comple-
tion-at least in those jurisdictions which have not extended war-
ranty to houses purchased after construction. In Colorado and
other jurisdictions'8 extending the rule to completed housing,0 9
however, liability could not be circumvented in this manner.
It is clear that the lender-vendor should be liable for defects
in construction completed under his ownership. The question is
whether he should also be liable for defects in work completed by
the defaulting developer. Since the construction lender inspects
at various stages of construction prior to the foreclosure, it is,
arguably, reasonable to burden him with the warranty of the
builder's work. This argument is strengthened by the fact that,
in completing the project, the lender would have an even better
opportunity to inspect the work of his predecessor and to deter-
mine and correct any defects. In support of the lender-vendor, it
can be argued that it would be too burdensome for him to warrant
all of the builder's construction. Due to the time and costs in-
volved, the opportunities for such inspections are somewhat lim-
ited. Also, the lender's expertise in construction is limited in that
the inspectors cannot be expected to be qualified engineers, archi-
tects, and contractors, but rather are more likely to be specialists
in the area of real estate finance, appraisal, and development.
"' See text accompanying notes 25-59 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 60-79 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 80-98 supra.
Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
,o See cases cited notes 45-46 supra.
Carpenter v. Donohue, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
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The complex nature of the housing units makes it impossible to
detect all of the potential errors.
In recognition of these conflicting arguments, a court might
reach a compromise between the extremes of no warranty for the
work of the original builder and absolute warranty once the lender
does work as a builder. Perhaps courts will impose a warranty
against any defects created by the builder which should have
been discoverable.
The concept of "deeper pockets," recently expanded in con-
sumer credit cases, may provide courts the argument necessary
to tip the scales against the lender-vendor. The courts, under this
doctrine, tend to place the financial burden upon the party best
able to bear it."' The problem presented involves a home buyer
against an institutional construction lender. Doubtless the lender
is in a far better position to bear the financial risk of structural
defects, but imposing increased costs on the construction lender
could well result in higher interest rates, increased cost of hous-
ing, and a greater shortage of housing. At the same time, however,
the lender is more aware of the problems which arise in housing,
and is able to reduce his potential liability through other means;
thus, the arguments against the lender-vendor seem to outweigh
the arguments in his favor. The lender stands in a position to
minimize the risk to the consumers, and, through insurance, to
minimize his own risk.
Negligence actions have given rise to builder's liability for
defects in design as well as in construction."' The lender, as
noted, is not an expert in the area of architectural design, and it
is, therefore, arguable that he should bear no liability for defec-
tive design. However, the lender inspects the preliminary plans
of the project before construction, and at this time is presented
with the opportunity to require alterations. Moreover, while it is
conceded that the construction lender does not have the expertise
of an architect, he does have a far greater knowledge of functional
dwelling designs than does the average purchaser. Many lenders
may very well have expertise in housing designs comparable to
C' ross v. M.C. Carlisle & Co., 368 F.2d 947 (1st Cir. 1966).
E.g., Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1178 (1972).
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that of a builder, who, even though he is not a licensed architect,
is held liable for defects in design.
Strict liability under section 402A requires that the defen-
dant be "in the business of selling such a product""' 2 and a major
problem arises as to whether a lender can be considered a seller
within the meaning of the section. The builder-vendor is clearly
in the business of selling houses and condominiums and so may
be liable under strict liability as a seller of "any product.""' 3
However, the construction lender is in the business of lending
money at a set rate of interest, and is not normally involved in
marketing real estate. It is difficult to conceive of a court holding
that a construction lender, who obtained ownership by involun-
tary circumstances beyond his control, was "in the business of
selling" for purposes of strict liability.
In summary, the theories of liability against the lender-
vendor as lender, vendor, or builder-vendor may be sufficient in
themselves for courts to impose liability for injuries resulting
from construction defects. If a court cannot fit a lender-vendor
into any one role, the multiple theories, taken in the aggregate,
may convince a court that a lender-vendor should be liable to
purchasers of new housing for such injuries.
CONCLUSION
There are several possible alternatives by which a lender-
vendor may avoid liability. The lender could, at the time of resale
of the units, include in the contracts an "as is" clause or other
express disclaimers of warranties. The lender might advertise the
sale of the units as a liquidation and characterize itself not as a
vendor, but as a mortgagee attempting to minimize its losses in
recovering debt. The lender could publicize any disclaimers, but
this would be undesirable because its probable result would be
depressed market values and a larger potential loss to the lender.
The lender could reasonably expect that the disclaimers would be
challenged in the event of physical injury; moreover, disclaimers
would not protect a lender from liability for its own negligence.
It seems unlikely, given the bargaining position of home buyers,
that courts will give much credence to such disclaimers.
"I RFSTATEMENT § 402A.
113 Id.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
Another possible solution is the use of indemnity contracts
with the borrower-builder for any liability to which the lender is
exposed. But, as the borrower is in default on the loan and, there-
fore, may well be judgment proof, it appears futile for the lender
to require such an assurance.
The lender may be able to limit liability through the creation
of a subsidiary to perform the function of selling the units, or of
both purchasing them at foreclosure and reselling them."4 The
pitfall of the subsidiary solution is that courts may pierce the
corporate veil of the subsidiary if there is inadequate capitaliza-
tion. Adequacy of a subsidiary's capitalization is measured by the
nature and the magnitude of the subsidiary's undertakings, and
courts look for a reasonable "cushion" for creditors."5 If the cor-
poration will not have sufficient funds to meet its debts or pro-
spective liabilities, then the capitalization will be held inade-
quate."6
Liability of the mortgagee can depend upon the lender's
functioning as an inspector of the construction process. With re-
spect to this function, the lender can avoid liability by subcon-
tracting the inspection function to a title insurance company.
The title insurance company would then make the necessary
inspections prior to the loan disbursements. This solution ap-
pears insufficient, however, because the lender is relying on a
delegation of duty to relieve him from liability, and such reliance
will probably be unacceptable to the courts."7
Large institutional lenders can use smaller institutional
investors or mortgage banking firms to provide a possible shield
"I The applicable statute permits a national bank to purchase, hold (for 5 years), and
convey real estate "conveyed to it in satisfaction of debts previously contracted in the
course of its dealings." 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1970). If a bank or its subsidiary is unable to
dispose of the real estate within 5 years, it should comply with regulations of the Comp-
troller at 4 CCH FED. BANKING LAW REP. 60,853, 60,854 (1969). The subsidiary of a
national bank may perform any business functions which the parent bank is permitted to
perform. Comptroller's Manual for National Banks, 2 C.F.R. § 7.7376b, 4 CCH FED.
BANKING LAW REP. 60,915 (1969).
H. HENN. LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 146 (2d ed. 1970).
' 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 44.1 (perm. ed.
rev. repl. 1974).
,, The lender, attempting to avoid liability by delegating his duty, would probably
be held liable for the acts of his delegatee under the doctrine of vicarious liability. See
PROSSER § 69, at 458-59.
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from liability. Under such an arrangement a loan participation
agreement would be entered into between the two lenders, where
the funds for the loan are provided by both lenders but primarily
by the larger mortgagee. The smaller lender takes care of the
inspections, disbursements, and loan servicing with the larger
lender playing a passive role by collecting the interest and wiring
funds. Since the active lender performs almost all the functions
to which liability can be attributed, it seems likely that the pas-
sive role of the loan participant will place him outside of liability
for structural defects. The argument is further strengthened in
that the passive lender in many instances will be geographically
separated from the project. The only problem arising from this
solution is that courts may impute the negligence of the active
lender to the passive one, thus establishing liability on behalf of
the passive mortgagee.
The only safe alternative for the construction mortgagee is
insurance. Vast improvements in warranty insurance of housing
and condominium units have recently been made by the insur-
ance industry. In Colorado, homeowners warranty insurance is
being instituted by the home building industry. ,,8 The policy pro-
vides for 10-year protection to the home buyer. The lender-
vendor, by requiring builders to take out this type of warranty
insurance, provides the best possible protection for itself against
potential liability for structural defects in the housing units as
well as providing adequate economic protection to the new home
purchaser.
John W. O'Dorisio, Jr.
" Homeowners warranty insurance has been extended to high-rise condominiums.
See The Appraiser, vol. 31, Dec. 1975, at 8.
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